Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Richard C. Bush worked on China and Taiwan issues in the U.S. government for nineteen years. He is now Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

Michael E. O'Hanlon holds the Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair at the Brookings Institution. His articles appear regularly in Slate, Foreign Affairs, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Times, and the Wall Street Journal. A leading expert on national security, O'Hanlon frequently comments on the news for major papers, news channels, and NPR.

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Washington has split between those who think we will eventually go to war with China (mostly conservatives) and those who find these alarums unconvincing (mostly centrists). They've even developed pejoratives for each camp: Panda Sluggers versus Panda Huggers. A War Like No Other argues against both, warning that America and China are closer to war than most people realize, in large part because China and Taiwan could blunder into a conflict that neither side wants. The road from slightest provocation to economically disastrous superpower standoff is a short one.

National security expert Michael O'Hanlon has developed a sterling reputation for clear-eyed analysis, especially for his early and ongoing prescience and accuracy concerning America's involvement in Iraq. A War Like No Other teams him with noted China scholar Richard Bush to assess the threat that keeps them both up at night: the chilling of relations between the United States and China from simply wary to detrimentally antagonistic.

Two decades from now, China will likely be the undisputed number-two global power and, if its phenomenal growth continues, it may well achieve superpower status before the end of the century. Since it began to explore and develop its industrial potential in the early 1980s, it has become one of America's largest trading partners, dependable debt holders, and sources of low-priced goods. It may also become America's most powerful diplomatic, economic, and military rival. How will this complex relationship play out on the world stage?

In A War Like No Other, Brookings scholars Richard Bush and Michael O'Hanlon delve into the dangerous consequences of this new dynamic. Other commentators fear the results of recent alarming conflicts over trade, monetary policy, relations with Iran and North Korea, competition for scarce oil, and even China's growing economic and military strength. Bush and O'Hanlon deftly sort through the issues, putting them in context. Each alone is hardly a credible cause for war. However, each of these could contribute to a more poisonous atmosphere than ever in which to confront the only issue that could really spark conflict: Taiwan. The nebulous status of Taiwan has sparked crises in the past and will continue indefinitely as the most likely source of conflict between China and the United States.

Filled with revealing accounts of past crises, insightful analyses of the ways in which the United States and China often fail to communicate, and controversial prescriptions for managing the inevitable conflicts between a reigning superpower and a rising contender, A War Like No Other is must reading for anyone interested in U.S./China relations, diplomacy, foreign policy, and the fine line between competition and conflict.

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Washington has split between those who think we will eventually go to war with China (mostly conservatives) and those who find these alarums unconvincing (mostly centrists). They've even developed pejoratives for each camp: Panda Sluggers versus Panda Huggers. "A War Like No Other" argues against both, warning that America and China are closer to war than most people realize, in large part because China and Taiwan could blunder into a conflict that neither side wants. The road from slightest provocation to economically disastrous superpower standoff is a short one.

National security expert Michael O'Hanlon has developed a sterling reputation for clear-eyed analysis, especially for his early and ongoing prescience and accuracy concerning America's involvement in Iraq. A War Like No Other teams him with noted China scholar Richard Bush to assess the threat that keeps them both up at night: the chilling of relations between the United States and China from simply wary to detrimentally antagonistic.

Two decades from now, China will likely be the undisputed number-two global power and, if its phenomenal growth continues, it may well achieve superpower status before the end of the century. Since it began to explore and develop its industrial potential in the early 1980s, it has become one of America's largest trading partners, dependable debt holders, and sources of low-priced goods. It may also become America's most powerful diplomatic, economic, and military rival. How will this complex relationship play out on the world stage?

In "A War Like No Other," Brookings scholars Richard Bush and Michael O'Hanlon delve into the dangerous consequences of this new dynamic. Other commentators fear the results of recent alarming conflicts over trade, monetary policy, relations with Iran and North Korea, competition for scarce oil, and even China's growing economic and military strength. Bush and O'Hanlon deftly sort through the issues, putting them in context. Each alone is hardly a credible cause for war. However, each of these could contribute to a more poisonous atmosphere than ever in which to confront the only issue that could really spark conflict: Taiwan. The nebulous status of Taiwan has sparked crises in the past and will continue indefinitely as the most likely source of conflict between China and the United States.

Filled with revealing accounts of past crises, insightful analyses of the ways in which the United States and China often fail to communicate, and controversial prescriptions for managing the inevitable conflicts between a reigning superpower and a rising contender, "A War Like No Other" is must reading for anyone interested in U.S./China relations, diplomacy, foreign policy, and the fine line between competition and conflict.

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A War Like No Other

John Wiley & Sons

Chapter One

In October 1995, U.S. relations with China had become tense, over the issue of Taiwan. A group of senior Chinese officers were debating with an American named Charles "Chas" Freeman about whether the United States would respond to aggressive exercises that China was planning. The exercises carried a clear signal of China's displeasure toward Taiwan's leaders.

Freeman, a retired foreign service officer, and an interpreter during Richard Nixon's 1972 trip to China, had become a favored unofficial interlocutor for senior Chinese officials thereafter. Freeman said there would be an American response.

Citing America's casualty-averse posture in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, the Chinese were dismissive. One senior Chinese general escalated the rhetoric: "You do not have the strategic leverage that you had in the 1950s, when you threatened nuclear strikes on us. You were able to do that because we could not hit back. But if you hit us now, we can hit back. So you will not make those threats.

"In the end," he said, "you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei."

The remark created a firestorm as China watchers parsed his statement. The only way China can truly harm Los Angeles is with intercontinental ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear weapons.

Freeman insisted later that the Chinese statement was made "in a deterrent context"-that is, it was about whether Washington could make nuclear threats of its own with impunity anymore-and so really did not constitute a warning to the City of Angels. One may also interpret the sentence as saying that China's interest in Taiwan was fundamental, whereas America's was peripheral (what might be called an "imbalance of fervor"). One may further surmise that the Chinese invective was fueled by a bit too much mao-tai. And on its own, neither the "no longer threaten with impunity" thought nor the "imbalance of fervor" thought was remarkable or necessarily false. But if words have meaning, linking the two ideas together could represent a threat to carry out a nuclear strike on California if America were to defend Taiwan.

Although the statement was uttered in the heat of the moment and probably did not reflect Chinese policy at the time, it does reveal something important about how Chinese generals thought about Taiwan, about the United States, and about the use of Chinese military power.

Rather astounding, moreover, was how little time it had taken for the United States and China to begin to think the unthinkable. A few months before, Beijing and Washington had been caught up in diplomatic disputes over human rights, intellectual property, and nonproliferation. Now, at best, they were discussing whether the United States could still engage in nuclear blackmail against China. When in January 1996 American officials learned of the Chinese general's remarks to Chas Freeman, they interpreted them as either bluster or a calculated bluff that should not go unchallenged.

Then, in March 1996, there occurred the most significant military standoff between the United States and China in almost forty years.

The root cause of this standoff, strangely, was a simple visit to Ithaca, New York. The person making the visit to Ithaca and to Cornell University there was Lee Teng-hui, the president of Taiwan, which, to the confusion of most Americans, is officially known as the Republic of China. (What we typically refer to as China is the People's Republic of China, or PRC.) The leaders of the People's Republic of China took that visit as a serious challenge to their definition of what Taiwan was and its place in the world (or lack of one). Specifically, they regard Taiwan as legally part of the People's Republic. Only through accidents of history has it not come under their sovereign control. They expect that someday it will be reunified as a subordinate unit, as Hong Kong was in 1997.

Until that day arrives, they think it perfectly logical that Taiwan leaders limit their international activities. So, in 1995, they had expected the administration of President Bill Clinton to follow their wishes and block Lee's trip. When it did not, China initiated a sharp deterioration of relations with both Taiwan and the United States and engaged in aggressive military exercises involving the firing of ballistic missiles that landed near Taiwan's coasts. While China never had any intention of going to war, American officials understood then that accidents could happen. They also knew that they could no longer take peace in the Taiwan Strait for granted. The combination of Taiwan's democratic politics, the vision of its president, China's orthodox policy toward the island, and Washington's complex stance toward the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had triggered an emotional reaction. The region would never be the same.

Taking office in 1988, Lee had completed the hard work of transforming the Taiwanese political system into a democracy, and the culmination of that effort would be a direct presidential election in 1996. Lee was proud of those achievements, and he believed they gave him a moral authority that his authoritarian counterparts in the Chinese capital of Beijing lacked. Armed with that legitimacy, he wanted to break the diplomatic quarantine to which China had long subjected Taiwan because it believed the island was a wayward province of China that had yet to "return to the embrace of the motherland." Lee had started his campaign to break the blockade by making trips to neighboring Asian countries. But the big prize was the United States. He had other reasons as well. Political dialogue with Beijing was at a stalemate, and Lee needed to make a point to gain negotiating leverage. An American trip would help him do that, he thought (incorrectly, as it turned out). It also would help him boost his electoral chances at home (on this point, Lee was proven right).

Lee had another, final reason to go to Ithaca: he was angry at the Clinton administration. In April 1994, he had planned to go through Hawaii on the way to South America. The United States had allowed other senior Taiwan leaders to make similar transit stops as long as they kept a low profile. But Lee wanted to raise the profile and stay long enough to indulge his passion for golf. The Clinton administration refused and allowed only a brief refueling stop. Some of Taiwan's friends in Congress heard about Lee's treatment and began working on legislation to restrict the executive branch's flexibility concerning his travel. Lee went further. Through a private organization he controlled, he hired an American lobbying firm, which soon mounted a highly sophisticated effort to pressure the administration to permit him to visit Cornell, contrary to past policy. If persuasion worked, fine. If not, Congress would pass binding legislation. What harm would it do for the leader of a friendly democracy to visit his alma mater and give a speech?

China was taken aback by this turn of events. Under the rules of the game adopted after Washington established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979 (and simultaneously ended them with Taipei), senior Taiwan leaders could only transit through an American city on the way to visit one of the island's diplomatic partners. And they could do so only stealthily. There could be no public events. This system provided convenience to Taiwan but preserved the Chinese claim that Taiwan was not its own country.

Lee Teng-hui's proposal would destroy that previous facade, but the Clinton administration never gave Congress and the media a persuasive answer to the question of what harm it would do. China's diplomats dmarched the State Department to convey China's strong opposition. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured China's foreign minister, Qian Qichen, that such a visit was inconsistent with U.S. policy, but he also sought to warn Beijing that Congress was about to take away the president's flexibility. China heard the assurance but ignored the warning.

In the end, Clinton bowed to Capitol Hill and permitted Lee to come. The administration then sought to place limits on the political character of the visit, with little success. In response, and under pressure from some generals and civilian politicians, the Chinese leadership decided that a stiff response was required to demonstrate the seriousness with which it viewed this action and to deter future transgressions. It branded the visit evidence of a secessionist plot by Lee. It suspended cross-strait dialogue between the organizations designated to forge cooperative arrangements between the two sides, on the grounds that Lee had poisoned the political atmosphere. It canceled normal exchanges of officials between the United States and China, recalled the Chinese ambassador to Washington, and delayed its concurrence with Clinton's selection of the new American ambassador to Beijing.

And the Chinese leadership engaged in military intimidation. Routine exercises were given publicity. Of even greater concern, ballistic missiles were fired into the sea in an area eighty-five miles north of Taiwan in mid-July. That had an immediate psychological effect on the island, where the stock market fell. Air and naval maneuvers by China, complete with the firing of antiship missiles, followed in August.

Amid this and a host of other problems, there were efforts to get the U.S.-China relationship back on track. Chinese president Jiang Zemin met with Clinton in New York in late October. But Beijing's campaign of intimidation was resuming as well. It was at this time that the senior Chinese general made his "you care more about Los Angeles" remark to Chas Freeman. In late November, a week before legislative elections on Taiwan, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a relatively large-scale amphibious exercise on a coastal island to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. Lee's Kuomintang Party did badly in the elections. Thus perhaps encouraged, the PLA prepared for the presidential election in March 1996. This time it chose to compress in time the various exercises that it had conducted over several months in 1995 (missile firings, air and naval maneuvers, amphibious landings) and move the missile firings closer to the island.

It happened that a senior Chinese foreign policy official, Liu Huaqiu, arrived in Washington the very day the first missiles were fired outside Taiwan's two major ports, March 7, 1996. When Liu dined with senior administration officials that evening, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry was particularly harsh in his criticism of the exercises. He called them "dangerous, coercive, absolutely unnecessary, and risky." He compared the two closure zones to the brackets that artillerymen use to range a target (Perry had been in the artillery corps himself in the U.S. military).

Perry and his colleagues understood that China was not about to attack Taiwan, but he in particular felt strongly that the United States had to demonstrate that it could not be ignored or intimidated. So they quickly decided that action was needed to deter China from doing "something stupid" (and to impress Congress and other domestic audiences that the administration was not weak). On their recommendation, Clinton sent two aircraft carrier battle groups toward the waters east of Taiwan, much to China's surprise and Taiwan's gratitude.

Tensions persisted and the rhetoric flew for a couple more weeks, and then gradually tensions declined and strategists in all three capitals assessed what they had learned.

If the goal of China's leaders was to convince all concerned that China was dead serious about Taiwan, they succeeded with the missile tests and other exercises in the second half of 1995 and early 1996. They also had demonstrated the vulnerability of Taiwan's economy to coercion. But they paid a high price, as well. They caused great doubt in Asia about their commitment to peace and gave Americans one more reason to wonder whether China was a friendly country. By triggering the deployment of American carrier battle groups, they sharply reduced past ambiguity about whether Washington would defend Taiwan against Chinese attack. On Taiwan in particular, there was a growing feeling that the United States would defend the island under any circumstances. And for anyone who noticed, the 1995-1996 episode revealed that while the PLA could undertake displays of force, its ability to wreak significant damage on Taiwan was quite limited. It began a program to close that gap.

For the United States, the episode also had exposed a not-so-latent tension between Taiwan's democratic politics and China's desire to complete its mission of national unification. Leaders in Taipei and Beijing had previously shared a general belief that Taiwan was part of China and that unification should occur. They just disagreed on which government should rule the reunified state. Now a democratic Taiwan was asserting a right to participate in the international system, and China did not like what it was seeing. Worse, China would respond aggressively-even forcefully-to challenges to its unification goal. Washington, which had assumed before that this dispute would solve itself, now concluded that Beijing and Taipei might not act as rationally as it had expected and that the only way to protect the American interest in peace and security was to become more deeply involved.

Though it hasn't always been at the top of the American public's mind, this dangerous dynamic of Taiwan action, Chinese reaction, and American intervention, often accelerated by politics in each capital, would recur with alarming regularity over the next few years.

In 1999, Lee Teng-hui made a statement about Taiwan's political status-declaring that Taiwan and the PRC should interact on the basis of "state-to-state relations"-that China regarded as akin to a declaration of independence. The PLA's air force jets patrolled aggressively in the strait. The United States sought to dampen the dispute diplomatically.

In early 2000, in the run-up to the next Taiwan presidential election, China announced that "Taiwan independence means war." Beijing also believed that the goal of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in fact Taiwan independence. So did a victory by the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, mean war? The Clinton administration worried that it could and worked with both sides to calm the situation.

In the 2003-2004 Taiwan presidential campaign, Chen sought reelection by playing to his political base and stoking China's fears. Washington worried that Chen was taking its support for granted and that Beijing might overreact. It worked to restrain Taiwan and calm China.

Managing these minicrises-and preventing them in the first place-are difficult because the two sides really do now disagree on the core issue: the fundamental desirability of unification. A large part of Taiwan's reluctance is that China's model for unification-the one used for Hong Kong and referred to as "one country, two systems"-would put Taiwan in a subordinate position. Taiwan's leaders believe strongly that they are a sovereign entity, equal to the mainland government, and that if unification is going to take place, it has to occur on that basis, and it could theoretically. (There are people on Taiwan who want to have nothing to do with China and who want a totally separate country, but that is another story, and those people are in the clear minority.)

That disagreement is bad enough. On top of it, however, leaders also misperceive each others' motives, have to worry about political rivals and public opinion, and lack adequate communications channels to keep molehills from becoming mountains. So when Taipei leaders assert the island's sovereignty, Beijing leaders tend to see a separatist plot. China has refused to have an authoritative channel with Taiwan's president since 1999 unless the latter provides a major political reassurance-in effect, that he guarantee that he will not pursue independence. Taipei worries about the negotiating purposes to which such a concession will be put and so refuses to give it. Unlike buildings in an earthquake zone that are built flexibly to withstand most tremors, there is a rigidity in the China-Taiwan relationship that makes it vulnerable to even minor incidents.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from A War Like No Otherby Michael E. O'Hanlon Richard C. Bush Copyright © 2007 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Excerpted by permission.
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