Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Norrin M. Ripsman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Concordia University.

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PEACEMAKING by DEMOCRACIES

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Contents

Acknowledgments......................................................................................................................viiIntroduction.........................................................................................................................11 Domestic Opinion and Democratic Foreign Security Policy............................................................................272 The Domestic Decision-Making Environments of Great Britain, France, and the United States After Two World Wars.....................633 The Post-World War I Settlement, 1919..............................................................................................914 The Post-World War II Settlement, 1945-1954........................................................................................1315 Structural Autonomy and Democratic Foreign Security Policy: Conclusions and Implications...........................................221Bibliography.........................................................................................................................241Index................................................................................................................................261

Chapter One

What effect do democratic political institutions have on foreign security policy? Does public and parliamentary input into the policy process improve or hinder foreign policymaking in democratic states? Are these effects relatively uniform across democracies, or does the domestic impact on policy vary in different democratic states? While scholars give different answers to the first two questions, the conventional wisdom is that the domestic impact on policy is similar in different democratic states. Therefore, "democracy" is treated as a powerful analytical category for foreign policy analysts. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is wrong because it ignores the differences between democracies that can cause the domestic impact on foreign security policy to vary considerably across democratic states.

I will begin by showing that, despite their well-known disagreements, the leading schools of international relations theorists share this problematic assumption of democratic uniformity. Traditional realists, for example, contend that democracies are decidedly inferior to their autocratic or oligarchic counterparts in the international arena because they must compromise between pursuit of the national interest and the dictates of lay public opinion and the legislature. Liberals counter that an informed electorate and its principled parliamentary representatives convey indispensable advantages, particularly in policy implementation, international bargaining, and the integrity of the policymaking process, which nondemocratic regimes do not enjoy. Meanwhile, structural realists, or neorealists, assume that democracies-indeed all states-will behave in similar ways internationally, since they are compelled either to pursue the national interest in an anarchical international system or to perish.

I will then explain why we need a more nuanced model of foreign policymaking in democratic states that takes into account the distinctive political arrangements or domestic decision-making environments of different democratic states. The alternative model I present contends that the degree to which the foreign policymakers of a democratic state are affected, either positively or negatively, by domestic opinion depends primarily upon the degree of structural autonomy the foreign policy executive receives from its institutional structures, decision-making procedures, and prevailing procedural norms. Beyond these structural differences, I will also demonstrate that the leadership strategies employed by foreign policymakers-in particular their willingness to manipulate the secrecy of international negotiations to deceive their domestic opposition-cause further variance in the impact of domestic opinion on the foreign security policies of democracies. By unpacking the conventional category of "democracy" in this manner, I correct a fundamental misconception in the security literature that has inspired poorly specified theories-such as the democratic peace theory-and generated faulty policy advice.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify what the term "democracy" means for the purposes of this discussion. Conventional writings on foreign policy employ the terms "democratic," "liberal," "liberal/democratic," and sometimes "republican" almost interchangeably to denote regimes that can broadly be described as modern democracies. At the most basic level, democracy implies popular sovereignty-that is, that the ultimate source of authority resides within the people as a whole. Because they are sovereign, the constituents of the regime have the authority to determine policy, or at least set the limits within which policy must be conducted. In keeping with popular sovereignty, democracies share certain procedural norms, including: virtually universal suffrage, freely contested elections, public accountability of government officials, constitutional limitations on their power, open access to information, and public expression of preferences. Nonetheless, as William J. Dixon observes, states that may be termed democratic can vary significantly in the nature and character of the institutions through which public participation is exercised and the values that permeate the popular culture. This chapter probes the implications of popular sovereignty for the conduct of foreign relations.

Since, as we shall see, both liberal advocates and realist critics of democratic foreign policy address their arguments to the consequences of mass public opinion and legislative review for the making of foreign security policy, this chapter will do the same. Consequently, less attention will be devoted to the problem of particular interests and lobby groups than to the influence of the legislature and the lay electorate as a whole.

How Does Domestic Opinion Affect Foreign Policy? Conventional Answers

The Traditional Realist Perspective: Domestic Opinion as an Unfortunate Constraint

In his classic Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that while democracy was promising as an instrument of domestic prosperity and order, it lacked the ability to conduct foreign affairs on equal footing with authoritarian regimes. He wrote:

As for myself, I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments.... Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law in all classes of society: all of these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an...