The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method (A Bradford Book)

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9780262028950: The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method (A Bradford Book)
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[A]s Deutsch's discussion shows, we need to be much more careful both in how we formulate our arguments and how we understand them when we are considering philosophical methodology. For anyone wishing to think seriously about these issues, The Myth of the Intuitive is required reading.-Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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A defense of traditional philosophical method against challenges from practitioners of "experimental philosophy."In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition-in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of "metaphilosophical folklore," and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Goedel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the "Multiple Concepts" and "Expertise" replies, to be severely lacking.

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Max Emil Deutsch
Verlag: MIT University Press Group Ltd Apr 2015 (2015)
ISBN 10: 0262028956 ISBN 13: 9780262028950
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Buchbeschreibung MIT University Press Group Ltd Apr 2015, 2015. Buch. Zustand: Neu. Neuware - In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy ( xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition -- in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of 'metaphilosophical folklore,' and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Godel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the 'Multiple Concepts' and 'Expertise' replies, to be severely lacking. Englisch. Artikel-Nr. 9780262028950

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