Explaining the Computational Mind (The MIT Press) - Hardcover

Explaining the Computational Mind is a substantial and excellent contribution to the growing literature on the foundations of computational cognitive neuroscience....The book is a must-read piece that will have to be dealt with by anyone writing on computation in cognitive science. -Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Milkowski's inclusive notion of computation provides a very useful framework for considering a wide range of computational approaches....The book is clearly written and engaging throughout; it is highly recommended reading for anyone interested in scientific explanation of the mind. -Review of Metaphysics In Explaining the Computational Mind, Marcin Milkowski is driven by a similar desire to offer a non-semantic, mechanistic account of computation that accommodates scientific practice...This leads Milkowski to develop a 'transparent' account of computation...That such a unitary account of computation can be given is, according to Milkowski, warranted by the presumed fact that it is a natural kind. -Mind Milkowski addresses the notion of a computational mind in a concise and yet remarkably comprehensive manner... We appreciate the pluralistic flavor of this work... Milkowski gives a compelling and scientifically solid argument for the idea that computation can be described in various ways... An interesting contribution. The accurate and comprehensive presentation of both scientific and philosophical insights makes it a recommendation for anyone interested in computation and/or in cognitive science. -Constructivist Foundations

A defense of the computational explanation of cognition that relies on mechanistic philosophy of science and advocates for explanatory pluralism. In this book, Marcin Milkowski argues that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational-whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. Defending the computational explanation against objections to it-from John Searle and Hilary Putnam in particular-Milkowski writes that computationalism is here to stay but is not what many have taken it to be. It does not, for example, rely on a Cartesian gulf between software and hardware, or mind and brain. Milkowski's mechanistic construal of computation allows him to show that no purely computational explanation of a physical process will ever be complete. Computationalism is only plausible, he argues, if you also accept explanatory pluralism. Milkowski sketches a mechanistic theory of implementation of computation against a background of extant conceptions, describing four dissimilar computational models of cognition. He reviews other philosophical accounts of implementation and computational explanation and defends a notion of representation that is compatible with his mechanistic account and adequate vis a vis the four models discussed earlier. Instead of arguing that there is no computation without representation, he inverts the slogan and shows that there is no representation without computation-but explains that representation goes beyond purely computational considerations. Milkowski's arguments succeed in vindicating computational explanation in a novel way by relying on mechanistic theory of science and interventionist theory of causation.