Logic: The Question of Truth (Studies in Continental Thought) - Hardcover

Buch 65 von 133: Studies in Continental Thought

Heidegger, Martin

 
9780253354662: Logic: The Question of Truth (Studies in Continental Thought)
Hardcover
ISBN 10: 0253354668 ISBN 13: 9780253354662
Verlag: Indiana University Press, 2010

Inhaltsangabe

Martin Heidegger's 1925–26 lectures on truth and time provided much of the basis for his momentous work, Being and Time. Not published until 1976 as volume 21 of the Complete Works, three months before Heidegger's death, this work is central to Heidegger's overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth. The text shows the degree to which Aristotle underlies Heidegger's hermeneutical theory of meaning. It also contains Heidegger’s first published critique of Husserl and takes major steps toward establishing the temporal bases of logic and truth. Thomas Sheehan's elegant and insightful translation offers English-speaking readers access to this fundamental text for the first time.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Thomas Sheehan is Professor of Religious Studies at Stanford University.

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Logic

The Question of Truth

By Martin Heidegger, Thomas Sheehan

Indiana University Press

Copyright © 2010 English edition by Indiana University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-253-35466-2

Contents

Translator's Foreword, 
Introduction, 
§1. The first, most literal meaning of the word "logic", 
§2. A first indication of the concept of the subject matter of "logic", 
§3. A philosophizing logic and traditional scholastic logic, 
§4. The possibility and the being of truth in general. Skepticism, 
§5. Outline of the course. Bibliography, 
Prolegomenon. The contemporary situation of philosophical logic. (Psychologism and the question of truth), 
§6. Psychologism: the name and the concept, 
§7. Husserl's critique of psychologism, 
§8. The presuppositions of Husserl's critique: a specific concept of truth as the guiding idea, 
§9. The roots of these presuppositions, 
§10. Anti-critical questions. The need to take the question of the essence of truth back to Aristotle, 
Part I. The problem of truth in the decisive origins of philosophical logic, and the seedbed of traditional logic (focused on Aristotle), 
§11. The place of truth, and (proposition), 
§12. The basic structure of and the phenomenon of making sense, 
§13. The conditions of the possibility of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] being false. The question of truth, 
§14. The presupposition for Aristotle's interpretation of truth as the authentic determination of being, 
Part II. The radicalized question: What is truth? (A retrieval of the analysis of falsehood in terms of its ur-temporality), 
§15. The idea of a phenomenological chronology, 
§16. The conditions of the possibility of falsehood within the horizon of the analysis of existence, 
§17. Care as the being of existence. Concern-for and concern-about, authenticity and inauthenticity, 
§18. The ur-temporality of care, 
§19. Preparatory considerations toward attaining an original understanding of time. A return to the history of the philosophical interpretation of the concept of time, 
§20. Hegel's interpretation of time in the Encyclopaedia, 
§21. The influence of Aristotle on Hegel's and Bergson's interpretation of time, 
§22. A preliminary look at the meaning of time in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
§23. The interpretation of time in the Transcendental Analytic, 
§24. The function of time in the Transcendental Logic. A characterization of the problematic, 
§25. The question of the unity of nature, 
§26. The original a priori of all combining—the transcendental unity of apperception, 
§27. Time as the universal a priori form of all appearances, 
§28. Time as original pure self-affection, 
§29. The question about the connection between time as original self-affection and the "I think", 
§30. Interpretation of the First Analogy of Experience in the light of our interpretation of time, 
§31. The schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, 
§32. Number as the schema of quantity, 
§33. Sensation as the schema of reality, 
§34. Persistence as the schema of substance, 
§35. The time-determination of the synthesis speciosa, 
§36. The now-structure that we have attained: its character of referral and of making present. The phenomenal demonstrability and limits of Kant's interpretation of time, 
§37. Time as an existential of human existence—temporality and the structure of care. The statement as a making-present, 
Editor's Afterword, 
Glossaries, 
Abbreviations,


CHAPTER 1

Part I


The problem of truth in the decisive origins of philosophical logic, and the seedbed of traditional logic (focused on Aristotle)


Prefatory remark

[127] As we now discuss this question with a glance back to some texts of Aristotle, it does not mean that we are trying to give a complete interpretation of those texts. Let's presuppose such an interpretation as having already been carried out. Then, using our guiding question, let us simply focus on some individual theses of Aristotle. Our investigation aims at an original understanding of the problem of truth and a radical way of solving it, one in which our investigation of the problem up to now will gain its legitimacy, and in which its positive content will come to light.

We begin our concrete investigation of the current determinations of truth by characterizing the truth of propositions. This is hardly accidental or arbitrary. We do so because according to the traditional report, the proposition or judgment is the proper place of truth. What is the connection here?

In §11, we will deal with the place of truth and with the proposition ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Out of those preliminary discussions will come the need to discuss the basic structure of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and, in connection with that, to clarify the phenomenon of meaning.


* * * §11. The place of truth, and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (proposition)

The thesis that the proper place of truth is the proposition or judgment must be understood as an image insofar as "place" is a spatial term, whereas [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is not extended in space. [128] What the expression means is: the proposition is where truth originally and properly belongs. The proposition is what makes truth possible as such. When this thesis is asserted and taken unquestioningly as the basis of every explanation of truth, it is most often accompanied by a second thesis, one concerned with content—namely, that the thesis about the proposition as the place of truth was first enunciated by Aristotle. And usually this second thesis is connected with a third, namely, that Aristotle was the one who first determined the concept of truth—as the correspondence of thought with things. However (so this thesis usually affirms), since this concept of truth cannot stand up against critical reflection, Aristotle is the originator of this naïve concept of truth.

To put it another way, we have three theses:

1. The place of truth is the proposition.

2. Truth is the correspondence of thought with beings.

3. These two statements originate with Aristotle.


These three theses, which are widespread today and have been for a long time, are so many prejudices. It is not the case that Aristotle enunciated the first two theses, nor does he directly or indirectly teach what these theses assert. He originates theses (1) and (2) only in the sense that these came into circulation through an appeal to Aristotle that was based on an inadequate interpretation of him; and it continues unabatedly, even today, to determine the conception of the problem.

What does Aristotle say about truth and its relation to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as proposition?

In the first place, we must keep in mind the basic point: Aristotle never determined "truth" as such by going back to the proposition. Rather, if he ever makes any connection between [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (proposition) and truth, he does so in such a way that he determines the proposition through [129] truth, or more precisely, through the ability-to-be-true. But even this way of putting it is inadequate. The propositional statement is determined by...

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Verlag
Indiana University Press
Erscheinungsdatum
2010
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN 10 
0253354668
ISBN 13 
9780253354662
Einband
Gebundene Ausgabe
Anzahl der Seiten
356
Kontakt zum Hersteller
Nicht verfügbar
Verantwortliche Person
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