The Cold War, Propaganda, and the State–Private Network

By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower left office in 1961, the United States had developed a far-reaching capability to produce and disseminate propaganda across the globe, not to mention the resources and inclination to launch audacious covert operations. The United States did not, however, enter the Cold War with this machinery in place. These methods had been widely deployed during World War II, but the "usual American procedure of improvident disarmament" largely removed psychological warfare from the scene after the confrontation had ended. "The situation stood thus stagnant," assessed a later government report, "until eventually the realization dawned that here was a weapon which could be used in this twilight war zone in which we found ourselves living." But the reemergence of the U.S. psychological warfare apparatus was not simple, nor was it clear-cut. Those U.S. officials who advocated a resurgence of propaganda to combat communist incursions endured strong criticism from inside and outside government circles. Only in a time of war had the White House created such a structure, and the Cold War was not a conflict of the traditional kind. In spite of these challenges, the machinery for psychological warfare was designed, built, and refined under the presidency of Harry S. Truman and eagerly molded by his successor, Dwight Eisenhower. That both administrations decided to pour time and energy into propaganda also reveals much about the history of the twentieth century. In fact, the United States and many other nations developed mechanisms for shaping public opinion only in response to the peculiarities of what Eric Hobsbawm has called, an "age of extremes."

The U.S. Experience with Propaganda and Psychological Warfare to 1945

Although mankind has engaged in propaganda since ancient times, during the twentieth century it came to the fore as a persuasive technique. The explosion of communications and transportation technology, linking disparate and remote peoples from the four corners of the earth, made it increasingly feasible to spread information and far easier for people to consume it. Higher levels of literacy, moreover, meant that the opinions and attitudes of a global population could be fashioned and influenced by various media of communication, be it the written word, radio, or film. International politics also was transformed. Diplomacy ceased to be a private matter deliberated only by high-level officials behind closed doors; it was propelled into the public domain, where it could be debated and judged by those who read or wrote about it. As a result of these developments, public opinion had to be considered more than ever in the formulation of foreign policy. This fact became abundantly clear in an age that witnessed the phenomenon of total war. The "wars of the twentieth century" notes Hobsbawm, occurred "on a vaster scale than anything previously experienced." They were more demanding to those who fought in them and, furthermore, to those who stayed at home. Not only were citizens required to help make the endless products that sustain a war effort, but national leaders needed them to emotionally support the cause. For that reason, the warring governments used propaganda to mobilize civilians, soldiers, and allies or as a means to demoralize the enemy.

To some degree, propaganda has always played a role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917 soon led to the establishment of the country's first official propaganda agency. A week after declaring war on Germany, the U.S. president, Woodrow Wilson, created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and selected a journalist named George Creel to run it. "Under the pressure of tremendous necessities," Creel explained, "an organization grew that not only reached deep into every American community, but that carried to every corner of the civilized globe the full message of America's idealism, unselfishness, and indomitable purpose." After all, he argued, the "approval of the world" would lead to a "steady flow of inspiration to the trenches." The CPI provided domestic and foreign audiences with movies, literature, periodicals, booklets, and carefully selected articles to defend the U.S. entry into the war and to promote all aspects of U.S. life and culture. Private groups and citizens also rallied to assist the objectives of Creel's committee. Patriotic volunteers, known as the "Four Minute Men," delivered short speeches across the country to rouse support for the war, while numerous other private initiatives plowed a similar furrow during this time of national emergency. The CPI was primarily focused on domestic public opinion, but Creel was confident of the impact abroad and claimed that a "world that was either inimical, contemptuous, or indifferent" to the United States "was changed into a world of friends and well-wishers." Even if Creel was proud of what he and his committee had achieved, it did not lead to a permanent governmental information agency. Crucially, as it turned out, Congress was far less supportive of a peacetime information program and, at the war's end, shut the CPI down.

Yet Creel's attempts to project U.S. "ideals" and culture to foreign lands was an undertaking that complicated and compromised the U.S. government's traditional boundaries of public diplomacy. In general, Americans preferred that "cultural proselytizing" be left to private entities, and not to the state. Reifying these ideas, several philanthropic foundations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute of International Education, encouraged cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and foreign countries under the banner of "nongovernmental internationalism." The founder of the latter group, Stephen Duggen, spoke effusively about "a unity among men which transcends differences in the forms of government." But "to know it and understand it," he said in 1934, people "must be brought together." Although the work of Duggen and other private organizations satisfied the U.S. public's preference for keeping state interference to a minimum in cultural relations, the U.S. government did not completely decline to organize or administer some foreign exchanges. In 1908, for instance, Washington set aside funds for Chinese citizens to receive education in the United States through the Boxer Indemnity Scheme.

The emergence of totalitarian regimes, particularly in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, provided Americans with more ammunition to have doubts about the prospect of the state overseeing culture and information. At the same time, however, the rise of the Third Reich also created an imposing reason for Washington to...