Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (American Politics and Political Economy Series) - Softcover

Adler, E. Scott

 
9780226007564: Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (American Politics and Political Economy Series)
Softcover
ISBN 10: 0226007561 ISBN 13: 9780226007564
Verlag: University of Chicago Press, 2002

Inhaltsangabe

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure—the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods—the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s—Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Scott Adler is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder.


Scott Adler is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Von der hinteren Coverseite

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress continually obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to other aspects of House structure-the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods-the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s-Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

Aus dem Klappentext

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress continually obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms.

What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to other aspects of House structure-the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods-the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s-Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

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Verlag
University of Chicago Press
Erscheinungsdatum
2002
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN 10 
0226007561
ISBN 13 
9780226007564
Einband
Taschenbuch
Auflage
2
Anzahl der Seiten
275
Kontakt zum Hersteller
Nicht verfügbar
Verantwortliche Person
Buchbär
info@buchbaer.de

Weberstr. 67
Osnabrück
49084
Deutschland

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9780226007557: Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (American Politics & Political Economy)

Vorgestellte Ausgabe

ISBN 10:  0226007553 ISBN 13:  9780226007557
Verlag: UNIV OF CHICAGO PR, 2002
Hardcover