The book is wonderfully written, full of insights and rich argumentation, covers a wide range of issues regarding liberal legitimacy, and does this with clarity and subtlety. It is the most sophisticated defence of Rawlsian liberalism available. ( Andres Moles, Journal of Applied Philosophy)
Quong is never anything less than a clear and reliable guide to the details of the philosophical debates of contemporary liberals. But his careful narrowings of these debates should not obscure the larger achievement of this very fine book. ( Larry Krasnoff, Social Theory and Practice)
Quong has written a highly valuable contribution to liberal political theory. His arguments against liberal perfectionism are compelling. This book should prove to be a vital resource for both political liberals and liberal perfectionists. ( Daniel Savery, Res Publica)
A growing number of political philosophers favour a view called liberal perfectionism. According to this view, liberal political morality is characterised by a commitment to helping individuals lead autonomous lives and making other valuable choices. In this book Jonathan Quong rejects this widely held view and offers an alternative account of liberal political morality. Quong argues that the liberal state should not be engaged in determining what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life nor trying to make sure that individuals live up to this ideal. Instead, it should remain neutral on the issue of the good life, and restrict itself to establishing the fair terms within which individuals can pursue their own beliefs about what gives value to their lives. The book thus defends a position known as political liberalism.
The first part of the book subjects the liberal perfectionist position to critical scrutiny, advancing three major objections that raise serious doubts about the liberal perfectionist position with regard to autonomy, paternalism, and political legitimacy. The latter chapters then present and defend a distinctive version of political liberalism. In particular, Quong clarifies and develops political liberalism's central thesis: that political principles, in order to be legitimate, must be publicly justifiable to reasonable people. Drawing on the work of John Rawls, Quong offers his own interpretation of this idea, and rebuts some of the main objections that have been pressed against it. In doing so, the book offers novel arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
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