A concise introduction and important contribution to the field of strategic learning in game theory
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H. Peyton Young is Senior Fellow in Economic Studies and Governance Studies and Co-Director of the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution. He is also Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and a Member of the Science Steering Committee at the Santa Fe Institute. His main areas of research and expertise are game theory, the design of legislative systems, public sector pricing, social norms, and public policy, in all of which he has published extensively.
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Zustand: New. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; and hypothesis testing. Series: Ryde Lectures. Num Pages: 176 pages, numerous graphs and line drawings, mathematical examples. BIC Classification: JMA; JMRL; KCA; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 213 x 148 x 20. Weight in Grams: 370. . 2004. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Artikel-Nr. V9780199269181
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