Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance (Transformations In Governance) - Hardcover

Why are international governmental organizations (IGOs) often so difficult even for powerful states to control? A major reason, as Tana Johnson shows in her important and original book, Organizational Progeny, is that bureaucrats often play key roles in designing new IGOs, and in doing so they often succeed in insulating the new IGOs from state control. International bureaucrats are agents in two senses: active shapers of their environments as well as occupants of organizational roles constrained by state policy. (Robert O. Keohane, Princeton University)

Organizational Progeny truly pushes us to reconsider the nature and consequences of delegation in global governance. Skillfully combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of the creation of international organizations, Tana Johnson convincingly shows how and why international bureaucrats matter to the design and evolution of cooperation in world politics. (Jonas Tallberg, Professor of Political Science, Stockholm University)

For all those who think that states pull all the strings when it comes to designing and controlling international organizations, Tana Johnsons excellent book will force you to think again. While most studies focus on states as principals and international bureaucrats as agents, Johnson demonstrates that many international bureaucrats have mastered the art of insulating themselves from state control. This is a terrific study. Give it a careful read, and you will have a much better grasp of international organizational politics. (Beth Simmons, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University)

In life, delegation is fundamental. But it is difficult, especially when attempted internationally, as in the long delegation chains to the United Nations family and other global governance structures. There, much hinges on the design of delegation relationships. What prompts another entity to fall in line - and if it does not, what can be done? For international organizations, the conventional answer is simple: when designing institutions, member-states endow themselves with stringent control mechanisms, such as monopolization of financing or vetoes over decision-making in the new body.

But as Tana Johnson shows, the conventional answer is outdated. States rarely design international organizations alone. Instead, negotiations usually involve international bureaucrats employed in pre-existing organizations. To unveil these overlooked but pivotal players, Organizational Progeny uses new data on nearly 200 intergovernmental organizations and detailed accounts of the origins of prominent and diverse institutions - the World Food Program, United Nations Development Program, International Energy Agency, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Financial Action Task Force, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS. When international bureaucrats have a say, they often strive to insulate new institutions against the usual control mechanisms by which states steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities.

This increases control costs for states, is difficult to roll back, and even produces bodies that powerful countries initially opposed. The result is a proliferation of organizational progeny over which national governments are literally losing "control". Johnson explores what this means for the democratic nature of global governance and how practitioners can encourage or staunch this phenomenon.

Transformations in Governance is a major new academic book series from Oxford University Press. It is designed to accommodate the impressive growth of research in comparative politics, international relations, public policy, federalism, environmental and urban studies concerned with the dispersion of authority from central states up to supranational institutions, down to subnational governments, and side-ways to public-private networks. It brings together work that significantly advances our understanding of the organization, causes, and consequences of multilevel and complex governance. The series is selective, containing annually a small number of books of exceptionally high quality by leading and emerging scholars.

The series targets mainly single-authored or co-authored work, but it is pluralistic in terms of disciplinary specialization, research design, method, and geographical scope. Case studies as well as comparative studies, historical as well as contemporary studies, and studies with a national, regional, or international focus are all central to its aims. Authors use qualitative, quantitative, formal modeling, or mixed methods. A trade mark of the books is that they combine scholarly rigour with readable prose and an attractive production style.

The series is edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the VU Amsterdam, and Walter Mattli of the University of Oxford.