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The Dragon in the Land of Snows

Penguin Books

Chapter One

The Lull Before the Storm

On 15 August 1947, India became an independent nation and inherited thepolitical influence and the privileges that Britain had gained in Tibet. Thishistoric transition was marked in Lhasa with a simple ceremony: the UnionJack was lowered and the Indian national flag was raised in its place. HughRichardson, the last British representative in Lhasa, became the first Indianrepresentative. Later he wrote: 'the transition was almost imperceptible.The existing staff was retained in its entirety and the only obvious changewas the change of flag'. But this was deceptive. The emergence of the newRepublic of India changed the traditional balance of power, and Asiannationalists envisaged that the collapse of the British Empire would lead tothe birth of a new order in Asia. And thus the history of modern Tibet inthe second half of the twentieth century was to become a search for themaintenance of its independence and international stature in this emergingregional order.

    Tibet occupied 1.2 million square kilometres of land sandwiched betweenthe two giants of Asia. To the south, the mighty Himalayas formed a naturalboundary with India. To the north and the east was China. For centuriesTibet had absorbed cultural influences from both these countries. Thepolitics of both countries had exercised considerable influence over thehistorical development of Tibet. This enormous landmass had always beenof strategic importance to the great powers. China had always coveted Tibetas the `treasure house' of the western region. When the British ruled India,they had always regarded Tibet as crucial to the security of India and theirimperial ambitions. As a result, they sought to gain influence in Tibet suchas no other Western country had ever enjoyed before. From 1913 onwardsBritain achieved considerable prestige in the country, thereby bringing itwithin the British sphere of influence. Tibet, for her part, wanted tocultivate good relations with Britain. It was the price for keeping theChinese at bay: as British influence increased across the Himalayas, soChinese prestige and influence faded.

    The end of the Second World War saw the collapse of the old imperialpowers in Asia. The British were forced out of the Indian sub-continent andtheir imperial ambitions reached a convenient end. The Japanese had beendefeated and expelled from the Asian mainland, which led to the eventualvictory of the Communists in China. It was a shift in the balance of powerthat marked the beginnings of the demise of Tibet as an independent state.

    When the Republic of China was founded, its authority in Tibet wasvirtually non-existent. One of the primary objectives of the Guomindangwas to restore its influence and a number of missions were dispatched toLhasa to re-establish relations with the Tibetans. The loss of Chineseinfluence was seen by the emerging Chinese nationalists as proof of Westernimperialist attempts to undermine the Chinese nation. After the collapse ofthe Qing Dynasty in 1911, China was internally divided and militarily weak.The Chinese nationalists therefore could not put into practice their claimthat China was a nation based on the `unity of five races'. Tibet remainedoutside the control of the Guomindang government. Moreover, Tibetanswere convinced that they should have their rightful place in the world as anindependent nation and were thus determined to oppose Chinese attemptsto gain a foothold in Lhasa. However, we shall see later that theGuomindang regime was determined to assert its claims over Tibet.

Tibet and its Neighbours

To a large extent Tibet's ability to survive as an independent nationdepended on its southern neighbour, British India. India's willingness topreserve Tibet as a natural buffer state between China and itself was crucialto the future status of Tibet. The question was: would the newlyindependent India have the will and the power to safeguard Tibet'sinherited privileges or would these be discarded as an anachronism of theage of imperialism? At first, India appeared willing to maintain the privilegessecured by its former ruler. But the question remained: would India be ableto resist pressure from the newly emerging China? The new India lacked theeconomic and military power possessed by her former colonial ruler, whoseempire had represented one of the greatest powers in the world, with navaland military power stretched across the globe. The primary tasks facing theIndian leaders were economic development of the country and cessation ofthe sectarian strife, which had already cost thousands of lives. Relations withthe new Islamic state of Pakistan were also on the brink of collapse.Therefore, the problems that were about to unfold in the northern bordersalong the Himalayan range were the least of their concerns.

    However, the new leaders of India should have been aware of the delicatesituation they were about to inherit from the British. In March 1947, theIndian Council for World Affairs, with support from the Congress leaders,convened an Inter-Asian Relations Conference; Nehru hailed it as alandmark in the history of Asia, intended to discuss the role of Asia in thepost-war and post-colonial period. Initially Tibet was represented as anindependent nation. A map displayed at the conference showed Tibet asseparate from China and the Tibetan delegation unveiled for the first timethe newly invented national flag. These symbols of Tibet's new-foundinternational status were rejected by the Chinese delegation, whichprotested to the Indian organisers.

    In the end a compromise was reached: the Tibetans were allowed toparticipate in the conference, but the offending map and flag were removed.This benefited neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans: the Tibetan presenceat the conference in no way indicated that the Chinese would concede to thistemporary solution and the Tibetans were still unsure whether theinternational community viewed Tibet as a nation separate from China. Theincident should have told the new Indian leaders that the Chinese were notprepared to accept Tibet's separate identity and that the uncertain status ofTibet at their northern border would present a major problem for them.

    The Indian leaders may have felt that the civil war in China woulddistract the Chinese from over-extending themselves in the Tibetan plateau.But in January 1949 Chiang Kai-shek and his government surrendered tothe Communists and fled to Taiwan. It was now in the hands of the newCommunist government to realise the goal of unifying Tibet with China.The Communists proved to be even more determined than the Guomindangto assert China's control in Tibet. On 1 October 1949, the People'sRepublic of China was established and Chairman Mao proclaimed inTiananmen Square, `China has stood up.' For nearly two centuries Chinahad been wrecked by civil war, economic strife and Western imperialistonslaughts. But now, for the first time, a strong central government hademerged. This Communist Government was impelled by the two importantsocio-political phenomena of the twentieth century: nationalism andCommunism.

    On coming to power, the Communists made it clear that the lastremaining task for the victorious People's Liberation Army was theliberation of Tibet. The higher echelons of the Communist Party hadalready developed strategies for the incorporation of what they regarded as`Chinese National Minorities' within the framework of the People'sRepublic of China. The Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, Zhu De, in aspeech to the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference on 24September 1949, said: `the Common Programme demanded the waging ofthe revolutionary war to the very end and the liberation of all the territory ofChina, including Formosa, the Pescadores, Hainan Island and Tibet'.

    On 29 September 1949, the Common Programme was unanimouslyapproved by the National People's Congress. Thus, as far as the newCommunist government was concerned, Tibet was to be regarded asChinese territory and Tibetan issues were to be dealt under the rubric of a`National Minority'. Articles 50-53 dealt with national minority issues andbecame the basis of China's long-term policy towards the country.Nevertheless, the Communist leaders were acutely aware of their lack ofinfluence in Tibet.

    When the Communists came to power the influence regained by theGuomindang in Tibet had come to an end. The Tibetan Governmentdecided to terminate the contacts that had been established between theLhasa Government and the Guomindang regime. As noted earlier, thenationalists too had slowly to regain the power and influence lost by thecollapse of the Qing dynasty. From 1913 onwards Tibet had, to all intentsand purposes, been an independent state. It exercised full authority over itsinternal and external affairs, and Tibetans saw no reason why it should nowsuccumb to the Communists' propaganda. The Tibetans' response to theChinese claim was to declare vociferously Tibet's independence. However,Tibetans were also quick to realise that the Communists were very differentfrom the Guomindang and other previous Chinese governments. TheTibetans had been able to dismiss all pretension that the Guomindang hadany power in Tibet, but the Communists had proved their determination towin at all costs. When they declared their intention to liberate Tibet, manyTibetans realised that they meant it.

    The Communists were not prepared to accept any compromises; it wasanathema to them that Tibet should have an international personalitybeyond being a region of China. From the Chinese point of view, Tibet wasan `integral part of China' which had been encouraged by anti-Chinese andimperialist forces to break away from the `Motherland'. From the verybeginning of the anti-Japanese war, the Communists had appealed toChinese nationalism to gain support and they developed irredentist policies.They had won mass support because of their anti-Japanese stance andmilitant nationalism, which promised to unify and restore dignity to China.

    The Communists were clearly convinced that the territorial limits of thenew China lay along the foothills of the Himalayas. Moreover, they not onlybelieved in the incorporation of Tibet into China. They were also impelledby their revolutionary zeal to promote the socialist transformation of Tibet.The first objective of the Communists was to `re-establish [their]international prestige'. The question of Tibet was bound up with China'sperception of itself as a new nation, and of its international status. TheCommunists' victory caused immediate alarm among the Tibetan rulingélite. But because of a lack of Chinese presence in Tibet, there was still timeto make a last desperate attempt to secure Tibet's independence.

    The external threat to Tibet's status could not have come at a worse time.Tibet's supreme leader, the Dalai Lama, was a young boy of fourteen andhad not yet established his political authority. During the Dalai Lama'sminority Tibet was ruled by a regent and this transitional period had alwaysbeen a strain on the Tibetan political system. The ruling élite, composed ofthe aristocracy and the religious institutions, was deeply divided: the wholesociety was recovering from the Reting conspiracy, when the ex-RegentReting Rinpoche attempted to wrest power from the incumbent Regent,Taktra. This had nearly plunged Tibet into a civil war. The period between1913 and 1947 was a watershed in Tibetan history: during this period therewould have been real scope for Tibet to have emerged as a `nation state',provided the ruling élite had had the foresight and willingness to adapt tothe changes in the larger world. But that élite chose to remain oblivious towhat was going on around them.

    Resistance to change came mainly from the religious community, whichwas opposed to any kind of reform that appeared to diminish its power.High lamas and the monasteries used their enormous influence to obstructreforms that were desperately needed to transform Tibetan society. By 1949,therefore, Tibet was not equipped to oppose China either militarily orsocially. The immediate political reaction to the Chinese claims and to thevictory of the Communists was to remove any remnant of Chinese authorityin Tibet. Anyone suspected of being sympathetic to the Chinese wasexpelled. The highest executive body of the Tibetan Government, theKashag, appointed the Tsipon Namseling to draw up a list of all those whowere pro-Communist, including anyone who was closely associated with theChinese Mission.

The Expulsion of the Guomindang and the CommunistVictory in China

Since the eighteenth century the Chinese Government had maintainedrepresentatives in Lhasa, known as Ambans. The Amban was the symbol ofChinese authority in Tibet. But after the fall of the Qing dynasty(1644-1912) the Amban and his military escort were expelled from Lhasaand it was not until 1934 that contact between Tibet and China wasrenewed. On 25 April a high-ranking Nationalist delegation led by GeneralHuang Musang, Chiang Kai-shek's Vice-Chief of the General Staff, arrivedin Lhasa on the pretext of `paying posthumous tribute to the late DalaiLama', thus establishing the first formal relationship between Tibet andRepublican China. The arrival of Huang Musang in Lhasa not only markedthe resumption of Tibetan and Chinese contacts but once again brought tothe surface the issue of the nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. (Thisquestion was first raised at the tripartite Simla Conference, convened underaegis of the British, held between October 1913 and July 1914. Thenegotiation broke down because the Chinese and the Tibetans could notagree over the alignment of the Sino-Tibetan boundaries.) Huang's missionhad in effect removed the important role played by the British as mediatorsbetween Tibet and China during the Simla conference. The real politicalsignificance of the mission was the Guomindang's attempt to woo Tibetback into the Chinese fold. Huang came to Lhasa with a specific policyobjective, presenting a three-point proposal: (1) that Tibet must form a partof China, (2) that the Chinese would assume responsibility for Tibet'sdefence, (3) that the office of the Amban would be re-established in Lhasa.According to Chinese sources, Huang's mission was successful and heobtained Tibetans' willingness to hand over the conduct of foreign affairs toChina as long as Tibet was not incorporated as a province of China.However, the Tibetans claim that they not only rejected Huang's proposalbut demanded the return of territories east of the Drichu (Yangtze).Moreover, while the Chinese were eager to discard the British as mediator,the Tibetans insisted that any negotiation must involve their southernneighbour, British India. This was clearly important for the Tibetans, forBritish participation would have provided a form of international guarantee,but it was in China's interest to deny any international or legal character tothe meetings. This was to characterise much of Sino-Tibetan dialogue.Whatever may have transpired during Huang's visit, one thing was certain:for the Guomindang, permission to set up an office in Lhasa was a majorpropaganda achievement, resurrecting Chinese presence in Tibet.

    The British were not prepared to acquiesce to the return of the Chineseto Tibet, and determined to counter the reassertion of Chinese influence. Ifthe Chinese were allowed to establish a permanent mission in Lhasa, theBritish too wanted to set up an office in the Tibetan capital. This led to thevisit of Basil Gould, the Political Officer in Sikkim, in 1936 and the eventualestablishment of a British mission in Lhasa, housed at the Dekyi Lingka.

    On 25 November 1939 a nine-member delegation, consisting of staff fromthe Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, arrived in Lhasa, and werelater joined by Wu Zhongxin, the Commission's director of Tibetan Affairs.The arrival in Lhasa was carefully planned to coincide with the enthronementceremony for the fourteenth Dalai Lama. On 22 February 1940, WuZhongxin and other foreign representatives attended the ceremony in thePotala, the winter palace of the Dalai Lamas. Later the Guomindang and theCommunists claimed that Wu had `presided' over the ceremony and that hisinvolvement was essential to the recognition of the new Dalai Lama.

    There is no evidence to suggest that Wu Zhongxin `presided' over theinstallation of the Dalai Lama. However, the delegation managed toestablish a permanent office in Lhasa, and installed a direct radiocommunication with Nanjing. The return of the Chinese to Lhasa reflecteda growing support among Tibetan officials towards the Guomindangregime. A strong faction in Lhasa felt that some kind of reconciliation couldbe reached with the regime, which was prepared to accept Tibet's specialstatus within China. Later, the Guomindang was able to secure the supportof influential members of the Tibetan ruling élite, most prominent amongthem the Dalai Lama's family.

    The Tibetans never accepted that the presence of the Chinese mission inLhasa meant that they had acknowledged Chinese sovereignty. At the sametime the establishment of the British mission in Lhasa did not mean that theTibetans were prepared to surrender to the British. The decision to allowboth countries a mission was most likely meant to demonstrate Tibet'sindependence and maintain some kind of international visibility. Theestablishment of the British mission was not accompanied by de jurerecognition of Tibet's independent status. The legal status of the missionwas deliberately kept vague and it remained subordinate to the PoliticalOfficer in Sikkim. For the British the mission provided an importantfoothold in Tibet and its chief aim was to signal to the Chinese that theBritish would resist any Chinese attempt to reassert its authority in Tibet.

    The Guomindang Government had not relinquished China's claim thatTibet was an integral part of China. Therefore, the Chinese saw the openingof their mission in Lhasa as an assertion of China's sovereignty in Tibet.They saw the loss of Chinese authority in Tibet as a failure of their patrioticduty to reunite Tibet with China. Therefore, the success of Wu Zhongxin'smission represented an important propaganda achievement for the Guomindangregime.

    While the British were content to accept the status quo, the Chineseclearly were not. The Tibetans were painfully aware that the Chinese hadnever surrendered their claims over Tibet. As long as China had remainedweak and beset with internal conflict, there had been very little she could doto reassert her power. However, it was be a different matter once theCommunists had managed to secure victory in China. Like all previousregimes, the Communists regarded Tibet as a part of China, regardless ofwhat the Tibetans may have thought.

    Although the Chinese mission did not exercise any authority, the TibetanGovernment feared that the presence of the mission would enable theChinese Communists to establish a foothold in Lhasa. When the Kashagproposed that the mission should be expelled, this was readily approved bythe Regent, Taktra. Using the secret list of suspected Communistsympathisers and spies drawn up by Namseling, the Kashag planned theexpulsion. With great secrecy the Tibetan Government summoned troopsfrom Shigatse and Dingri and placed them in strategic positions in Lhasa.The Tibetans feared some Chinese would remain in Tibet and declare theirloyalty to the Communists.

    On 8 July 1949, the Kashag called Chen Xizhang, the acting director ofthe Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission office in Lhasa. He wasinformed that the Tibetan Government had decided to expel all Chineseconnected with the Guomindang Government. Fearing that the Chinesemight organise protests in the streets of Lhasa, the Kashag imposed acurfew until all the Chinese had left. This they did in three separategroups on 14, 17 and 20 July 1949. At the same time the TibetanGovernment sent a telegram to General Chiang Kai-shek and to PresidentLiu Zongren informing them of the decision. They stated that the actionwas prompted by the fear of Communist elements infiltrating the country.This fear was not without foundation; and there had been increasingdiscontent among members of the Chinese mission, who had been cut offfrom developments in China and had not received financial provisions forfive months. Some staff were talking about serving the `new government', ashad happened in other parts of China, and in fact, during the early period ofCommunist rule (1949-54), the new government in China retained most ofthe Guomindang officials in the administrative structure. It was thereforelikely that the Chinese mission in Lhasa would have simply switched itsallegiance to the new government.

    Both the Communists and the Nationalists objected strongly to thedecision to expel the Chinese mission in Lhasa. On 6 August Yan Xishan,President of the Executive Yuan, said that `all the members of the missionhad been carefully selected and there were no grounds for the expulsion' andcalled on the Tibetan Government to `rectify its decision'. Although theCommunists had not yet assumed power in China, they were quick tocondemn the Tibetan action and to appeal to Chinese nationalist sentiment.The Communists accused `imperialists' and their `running dogs' of`manufacturing the so-called anti-Communist incident in Tibet' and oftrying `to turn the 1.2 million sq km' into a colony. In an editorial on 2September 1949, the Hsin Hwa Pao remarked:

The affair of expelling the Han Chinese and Kuomingtang [Guomindang] officials at Lhasa was a plot undertaken by the local Tibetan authorities through the instigation of the British imperialists and their lackey the Nehru administration of India. The purpose of this `anti-Chinese affair' is to prevent the people in Tibet from being liberated by the Chinese People's Liberation Army ... The reactionary Kuomintang Government should be rooted out from every corner of China. But this is the business of the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. It has nothing to do with foreign countries.

    The editorial showed that the Communists saw the presence of theChinese Mission in Lhasa as evidence of Chinese authority over Tibet, andleft no doubt about the Communists' view regarding the status of Tibet,referring to the Tibetan Government as a `local government'. The editorialwent on to say:

The Chinese People's Liberation Army must liberate the whole territory of China, including Tibet, Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and so forth. Even an inch of Chinese land will not be permitted to be left outside the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. We tolerate no longer the aggression of the foreign countries. This is the unchangeable policy of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

    The Indian authorities were astonished at the allegations and at theunexpected display of `militant nationalism' by the Communists. Both theGuomindang and the Communists felt that the Indian mission in Lhasa, andparticularly Hugh Richardson, was responsible for the incident. This isconfirmed by some Tibetan officials: Lhawutara, a high-ranking monkofficial, writes that it was Richardson's suggestion to expel the Chinesemission. Phunstog Tashi Takla, who was the main person liaising with theChinese, also stated that the idea originated from Richardson. However,Richardson does not remember that he made such a suggestion, though heconcedes that he may have inadvertently commented on the danger posed bythe presence of the Chinese mission in Lhasa.

    According to official Indian sources, the expulsions also took them bysurprise. Soon after Chen Xizhang was informed of the decision,Richardson was summoned to the Tibetan Foreign Bureau and wasrequested to tell the GOI, and to ask them to provide a safe passage formembers of the Chinese mission. The demand placed great difficulties onthe GOI: if it complied the Chinese would accuse India of helping theTibetans; if it refused the Tibetans were placed in a difficult position. HughRichardson recommended `that it would have been better to allow theofficials to remain and to remove only persons suspected of subversiveactivities'. Chen Xizhang made a futile protest by refusing to provideevacuees with valid travel documents without orders from his government.Hugh Richardson noted that `this gesture was apparently intended toprovide evidence that his removal was by force'.

    In the end the expulsion of the Chinese mission from Lhasa was a shrewdmove on the part of the Tibetans. It not only ended the influence of theNationalists but it meant that, when the Communists came to power inChina in October 1949, there was no vestige of Chinese authority in Tibet.The Communists were immediately presented with the problem of howthey could assert their authority in Tibet, for it was clear that there was noscope for an internal Communist revolution there.

    Along with the Chinese mission, a number of Tibetans from the easternpoint of the country were expelled on suspicion of being Communistsympathisers. One of these was Baba Phuntsog Wangyal, a progressiveTibetan from Bathang in Kham who earlier had tried to organise aProgressive and Pan-Tibetan movement in Tibet. He came to Lhasa in 1946and tried to warn the Lhasa authorities that after the civil war theCommunists would invade Tibet. He argued that Tibet's survival lay inopening the country to the outside world and introducing internal reforms.When Lhasa officials did not listen to his warning, he went to Kalimpong tourge the British to arm the Tibetans. No one took him seriously, and whenhe was later expelled from Lhasa, he told his friend Tharchin, the editor ofwhat was then the only Tibetan newspaper: `If the Tibetan Governmentdoes not listen, I shall bring the Chinese Army to Tibet. Then I shall writeto you'. Tharchin later recalled that in 1951, when the PLA entered Lhasa,he received a telegram which read, `Safely arrived in Lhasa PhuntsogWangyal.' The Communists were able to recruit him to their ranks, and hewas to play a leading role during the negotiations between Tibet and Chinain May 1951.

    One of the negative aspects of this expulsion of Communist sympathiserswas that the Chinese Communists became convinced that foreign powershad penetrated Tibet and had stirred up hostility towards them. HughRichardson in his monthly report to the GOI commented, `At all events,they seem to have postponed the likelihood of Communist activities inLhasa by removing suspicious persons, but who can say for how long'.

    But however remote the Communist threat to Tibet now seemed, theatmosphere of fear in Lhasa became palpable. When a comet appeared in1949 it was taken as a bad omen. People were quick to point out that whenHalley's comet had appeared in 1910 the Chinese had launched an invasion.The government ordered performances of religious services to avert thedangers. Yet the majority of the Tibetan peasantry, living outside thepolitical environment of Lhasa, remained totally unaffected by the newpolitical development. The politics of Tibet had always been the privilege ofa few aristocratic families and the lamas in Lhasa. This is how HughRichardson summed up the situation in his monthly report for November1949:

Up to that time the atmosphere in Lhasa had been vague. A number of officials had [sic] personally appreciated the seriousness of their position and some are reported to be making plans for removing themselves, their families and possessions from Lhasa presumably to India. But others viewed the situation more lightly saying that Tibet is a small and poor country and that the Chinese Communists would not be likely to be attracted by it. Others again, notably minor monk officials, considered that as they were poor and had experience in governmental matters, they would be wanted by the Communists to work for them. Higher monk officials expressed their intention of dying for religion, at the head of their retainers.

    One leading aristocrat later recalled that `people started thinking ofmoving to India and started shifting their valuables either to India or to themonasteries' and summed up the atmosphere succinctly: `People were likebirds, ready to fly.' Others thought that it would take some time before theCommunists entered Tibet. Rinchen Dolma Taring, a member of a leadingaristocratic family, described her reaction to Peking's broadcast of itsintention of liberating Tibet: `in the late 1940s we heard rumours that theChinese Communists were coming, but we thought it might take them yearsto arrive because they has [had] said on the radio that they would first getFormosa'.

    The expulsion of the Chinese mission marked the beginning of a newphase in the Sino-Tibetan relationship. By severing its ties with China,Tibet had emphatically declared its desire to remain independent. On theother hand, this provocation made the Communists even more determinedto gain control of Tibet. It was evident that China and Tibet hadirreconcilable objectives. The question that was to dominate the first monthsof 1950 was whether reconciliation could be achieved through diplomacy orwhether it would be by coercion.

    In October 1949, the Communists assumed total control of China. Amonth later, the Tsongdu (Tibetan National Assembly) met to discuss theChinese threat. It was agreed that they should take various measures tocounter Chinese propaganda. First, they would make internal reforms toprepare for a possible Chinese attack. Second, they would seek to secureexternal support and, third, they would try to establish a dialogue with theCommunists.

    Up to that time Tibet had lived in isolation from the major social andpolitical events of the world. The Second World War had passeduneventfully for the Tibetans. The Tibetan socio-economic and politicalsystem resembled that of the Middle Ages in Europe. Between 1913 and1933 the thirteenth Dalai Lama had tried to drag Tibet into the twentiethcentury, but he had come up against the conservatism of the religiousinstitutions and a few of the ruling élite. Yet Tibetan society was neitherstagnating nor verging on collapse. There was a small group of Tibetanswho were well informed about the international situation, and a fewaristocratic families who had travelled outside Tibet and had sent theirchildren to missionary schools in India. Through them, the centre ofIndo-Tibetan trade, Kalimpong, had become a window on the outside world. Itwas largely these people who initiated efforts to modernise Tibet's army andadministration.

Tibet Prepares to Face the PRC

The National Assembly's recommendations for major internal changes wereendorsed by the Regent Taktra in 1949. The Kashag was reorganised intothree separate ministries: External Affairs, Defence, and Pay and Supplies.Each Shape was put in charge of a department; Kalon Lama Rampa wasput in charge of external affairs, assisted by Lukangwa and DrungyigchenmoChomphel Thupten; Surkhang Wangchen Gelek was givenresponsibility for dealing with military pay and supplies. He was assisted bythe Tsipon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme — who was later to play a leading role — andanother of the Drungyigchenmos, Ngawang Drakpa. Ragashag was incharge of defence and the mobilisation of troops. He was assisted by TsiponNamseling and Drungyigchenmo Ngawang Namgyal. As a matter ofurgency they were given power to act without consultation with theNational Assembly.

    The Kashag also decided they needed to monitor international news.Heinrich Harrer, an Austrian refugee who was living in Lhasa at the time,was asked to listen to the radio and provide the government with dailysummaries of international news. The most innovative decision was to setup a radio station in Lhasa. For a number of years the Tibetan Governmenthad been setting up a network of wireless communication systemsthroughout Tibet. For this purpose the Government had employed twoBritons, Robert Ford and Reginald Fox.

    In January 1950, Radio Lhasa broadcast to the world for the first time, inthe beginning for only half an hour a day. The news was read in Tibetan byRimshi Rasa Gyagen, in Chinese by Phuntsog Tashi Takla, the DalaiLama's brother-in-law, and in English by Reginald Fox. The primarypurpose of the broadcasts was to counter Chinese propaganda and on 31January 1950 Lhasa Radio rejected Beijing's claim that Tibet was part ofChina. The broadcast declared that Tibet had been `independent since 1912when the Manchu garrison had been driven out'.

    The National Assembly agreed to the opening of the country for motortraffic between India and Tibet. In 1949 J. E. Reid of General ElectricCompany visited Tibet to negotiate the Tibetan Government's purchase ofelectrical equipment for a small hydro-electrical station that the governmentplanned to build in Lhasa. More important, Regent Taktra gave Mr Reid aletter authorising Bharat Airways to fly the equipment to Lhasa. Tibet alsoexpressed a desire to open an air link between Lhasa and some northernIndian cities.

    Above all the Tibetans sought to strengthen their army. Since the 1930s,it had developed rapidly but was still poorly equipped and trained, despitethe training of a few officers by the British. In March 1947 the Kashag askedthe British Government to supply a substantial amount of arms andammunition. This was approved by the British Cabinet and the interimIndian Government, with the exception of two anti-aircraft guns. By 1949it was clear that the stock of ammunition and arms in Tibet's possessionwould be wholly inadequate to counter a Chinese offensive, and so theKashag agreed to sanction further military expenditure. For this they tooksilver coins (tangka) from the Potala treasury, worth four hundred thousandrupees, and minted them into 10 srang silver coins to meet the costs ofmilitary pay and supplies.

    In August 1949, when the Indian Political Officer in Sikkim, MrHarishwar Dayal, made a visit to Lhasa, Tibetans saw this as an opportunityto seek support from the GOI. They hoped to establish a new relationshipby drawing up a new treaty, which would supersede the 1914 SimlaConvention. At the first meeting between Dayal, Surkhang LhawangTopgyal and Liushar Thupten Tharpa from the Foreign Affairs Bureau, theTibetans asked if India could supply arms and ammunition but they weretold by the Indians that the primary task was to train Tibetan troops. TheGOI agreed to a small supply of arms and ammunition, and also to providetraining for new troops. At the second meeting, on 8 November 1949, theTibetans informed Dayal that the present strength of the Tibetan Army was13,000 but they wanted to increase it to 100,000 men. They inquiredwhether the GOI could provide the necessary instructors, arms andammunition. In the meantime the Tibetan Government set aboutrecruiting and training new soldiers; Heinrich Harrer describes how `the flatpasture lands around Lhasa were transformed into training grounds for thetroops'.

    On 25 February 1949 a meeting was held in Gyantse between DeponKunsangtse and the representative of the GOI, Colonel Srinivasan todiscuss training and weapon requirements. In June 1949, the IndianGovernment supplied a limited amount of arms and ammunition, whichincluded 144 Bren Guns; 1,260 rifles; 168 Sten guns; 500,000 rounds of .303ammunition, and 100,000 rounds of Sten gun ammunition. In March 1950,the GOI increased their supplies: 38 2' Mortars; 63 3' Mortars; 150 Brenguns; 14,000 2' mortar bombs; 14,000 3' mortars, and 1 million rounds of.303 ammunition. The Tibetan Government provided Mr Reid with thesum of one hundred thousand rupees for the purchase of small arms.

    The old regiment, founded in 1931 and known as the Drongdra Magmi(Better Family Regiment), was revived to strengthen the existing groups.However, it faced such a severe shortage of ammunition that soldiers werenot allowed to fire their weapons during training. The rations for soldierswere improved and an additional cash payment was agreed. Other regimentswere dispatched to the border regions, in eastern Tibet and the north-eastregions. The government also decided to set up four wireless stations inwestern and northern Tibet.

    On coming to power in China the Communists immediately strengthenedtheir control in Kham (Xikang) and Amdo (Qinghai). The situation ineastern Tibet became precarious. The Tibetan Government had beenobserving the de facto boundary line agreed at the Simla Convention of1914, which divided Tibet into outer and inner Tibet. Neither the Tibetan northe Chinese Government had ever been able to assert authority effectively inKham. Much of the area was ruled by local chiefs, who were fiercelyindependent. The Debpa Zhung (Tibetan Government) ruled territorieswest of the Upper Yangtze. The Domed Chikyab (Governor of Kham) wasresponsible for both administrative and military matters in Kham. TheTibetan army guarding the eastern frontier consisted of 2,500 men, whowere badly equipped and had received little or no training in modernmilitary methods. At the time the Domed Chikyab was Lhalu TsewangDorje, who had been in Kham for nearly three years and was due to bereplaced. Lhalu was aware of the growing threat of instability inChinese-controlled Kham where there was increasing PLA activity. The governordecided to strengthen the fortifications on the frontier and to strengthen hisforces by recruiting local militia.

    In the summer of 1949 Robert Ford, the Englishman employed by theTibetan Government as a radio operator, and three trainee wirelessoperators were dispatched to Chamdo. Their arrival enabled Lhalu toimprove the defensive measures in Chamdo and the surrounding areas.Moreover, for the first time a direct link was established between Lhasa andChamdo. In February 1950, Lhalu asked Ford to cut short the training ofthe wireless operators, so that he could set up wireless stations along thefrontier. Rumours of the PLA advance were widespread in Chamdo. In thesame month, new supplies of arms and instructors arrived and there wastraining in the use of Bren guns. Robert Ford wrote that `the Tibetan Armybegan to look a little less like something out of the Middle Ages'.

    Two months later, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme was appointed as the newGovernor of Kham. At the same time, he was promoted from the rank ofTsipon to Shape. The Governor of Kham had the same rank as a member ofthe Kashag, although he could not attend Kashag meetings in Lhasa. Theposition reflected the importance attached to the post, and it also meant thatthe governor could make immediate decisions without having to consultsuperiors in Lhasa. Ngabo had previously served in Kham as an official incharge of army pay and was therefore aware of the difficult position he wasabout to inherit. Before he left Lhasa, Ngabo discussed the situation withYuthok Tashi Dhondup, who had also served as Governor of Kham.Yuthok advised him that the best course of action was not to provoke theChinese or antagonise the local people. Ngabo wanted to improve theconditions for the local officials and asked the government to increase theirallowances. Ngabo also reached the conclusion that it would be impossibleto stand up to the PLA.

    Some saw the appointment of Ngabo as the Governor of Eastern Tibet asinauspicious. Chagtral Sonam Chophel recalls that there was a Tibetansaying that `when the throne of Tibet is guarded by a person of lower birth,then Tibet would be invaded by China', and people soon assumed that thisreferred to Ngabo. He was the illegitimate son of a nun from one of theleading aristocratic families of Tibet, Horkhang, who had acquired thesurname of Ngabo by marrying a young widow of Ngabo Shape.

    Ngabo arrived in Chamdo in September 1950 but because of the gravesituation in Kham, the Kashag decided that Lhalu should also remain inpower for the time being. The decision to appoint two governors seems tohave been a disaster. The relationship between the two was strained fromthe start, and Ngabo is reported to have remarked that Chamdo was toosmall for two governors. At the end of September, Lhalu left Chamdo andset up his headquarters in Pembar Dzong, leaving Ngabo in charge of bothcivil and military affairs in Chamdo. The border regions on the Changthang,the high plateau of north-east Tibet, were also strengthened. On 20 June,Ragashag Shape and a lay commander made an inspection tour of theNagchuka area. The number of men in the area was increased by therecruitment of local militia.

    Initially, the government wanted to raise the number of soldiers to100,000 but it proved impractical and those who could afford to briberecruiting officers to avoid serving. The attempts to modernise Tibet'spolity and the army came too late. Limited resources and the lack of amodern infrastructure hampered any military or civil defensive measuresthat the Tibetans adopted and there was no way that the Tibetans wouldhave been able to resist a determined Chinese attack. The supply of armsand ammunition would not last more than six months. Nevertheless, theTibetans did their best to show the Chinese their determination to resistinvasion. The ruling élite realised that the best chance for Tibet's survivallay in outside support. The Tibetans had already opened the country to anumber of outsiders; now they appealed directly to the internationalcommunity. Britain had dealt with Tibet as an independent country, but shehad never afforded Tibet the de jure recognition it sought. On the otherhand, neither had the British recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

    As far as the Tibetans were concerned, the status of Tibet was governedby the 1914 Simla Convention. However fragile it might be, the Conventionprovided some sort of definition of Tibet's status. In late 1949 and early1950, the primary objective of Tibetan foreign policy was to maintain thestatus quo, whereby Tibet would have total control over its internal affairsand would maintain some kind of external personality. For many years theTibetan Government had sought international recognition and visibility. In1948 the Kashag dispatched a high-level trade delegation abroad in order todemonstrate Tibetan independence. The trade mission secured a majordiplomatic coup when the United Kingdom and United States issued visason Tibetan passports. This was tantamount to official recognition of Tibet'sindependent status.

Continues...

Excerpted from The Dragon in the Land of Snowsby Tsering Shakya Copyright © 2000 by Tsering Shakya. Excerpted by permission.
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