Governance and Performance in Public and Non-Profit Organizations (5) (Studies in Public and Non-Profit Governance) - Hardcover

Double-blind peer-reviewed articles look at governance and performance in organizations first in the public sector, then in the non-profit sector. Among their topics are popular reporting and public governance: the case of "Bilancio in Arancio" in Milan municipality; a critical analysis of management control, accountability, and learning in public sector organizations; how board and chief executive officer characteristics can affect Italian and Canadian nonprofit financial performance; from governance to action: measuring the engagement of active stakeholders in the social enterprise; and fostering orientation to performance in nonprofit organizations through control and coordination: the case of corporate foundations and founder firms. -- Annotation * (protoview.com) *

Studies in Public and Non-Profit Governance (SPNPG) publishes double-blind peer reviewed articles in a growing area of governance research. The series focuses on the 'micro' level of governance in public and non-profit sector. Compared to the wider debate on corporate governance in the private sector and to the literature on the 'macro' and 'meso' levels of governance in the public sector, the organizational (micro) level of governance remains a neglected area of governance in the public and non-profit sector. Therefore, governance systems, mechanisms and roles are primarily investigated at organizational level. SPNPG allows for the establishment of an engaged community of researchers very active in the field. It aims to contribute to the definition of the theoretical components that assign an innovation role to governance systems in public and non profit organizations. It also highlights the opportunity for a deeper analysis of governance mechanisms in their relationships with both the external (stakeholders) actors and the internal (management) actors and address the conditions which enable governance mechanisms to effectively cover their own roles.