Críticas:
"A masterful and engaging book that illuminates the complexity of making war in a democracy. Clearly relevant to contemporary issues of military policy and foreign affairs, it should be read by anyone interested in American military and diplomatic history as well as anyone concerned about the future of the Republic."--H. R. McMaster, author of Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam"A massive, brilliant work that sustains its various themes through some three hundred years of American war fighting. Pearlman conveys a persuasive grasp of the whole, continually makes telling comparisons of recurrent phenomena, and has a special eye for apt quotations. This book may well become a classic."--J. Garry Clifford, author of The First Peacetime Draft "The chapter on World War II is brilliant. Pearlman's focus is splendid, his logic irrefutable, and his reading in sources wonderfully widespread."--Martin Blumenson, author of Patton: The Man Behind the Legend "The chapter on U.S. policy in the Vietnam War is one of the best I have seen--perhaps the best of its kind."--William C. Gibbons, author of The United States Government and the Vietnam War "A major work that makes an invaluable contribution to the literature."--John Chambers, author of To Raise an Army "Essential reading for those who would understand the why of military strategy as well as the what."--Naval War College Review"A detailed, judicious, highly informative, and sometimes irreverent account of the country's major military conflicts."--Journal of Military History "An insightful and engaging work, and it renders a great service by making the 'American style' of warfare comprehensible without oversimplifying."--The Historian "All interested in military history should find this volume a valuable addition to their library, both as a fresh explanation of the workings of the U.S. warmaking system and as a fascinating discussion of the rivalries and competitions that developed."--Army "Pearlman provides a broad, synoptic and penetrating study of American warmaking and strategic formulation within the framework of democratic constitutional political institutions."--Military Review "Essential reading for the military professional and anyone interested n how America goes to war."--Armor "This is a pathbreaking work, fresh and provocative."--Choice
Reseña del editor:
Shows how internal divisions--between political parties, presidents, and congress, elected representatives and bureaucrats, soldiers and civilians, and branches of the armed services--have always made the creation of military strategy extraordinarily complex, and explains why wartime goals, ways, and means often seem disconnected. Winner of the Henry Adams Prize.
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