Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View - Hardcover

Swanton's account makes virtue ethics more flexible than it has previously been and also better able to accommodate the insights of other ethical theories. (Vera Lex Journal of the International Natural Law Society, New Series)

... a richly detailed attempt to present a comprehensive theory of the virtues ... essential reading for anyone concerned with the question of virtue ethics. (Kantian Review)

... contains several provocative and insightful discussions. Swanton is genuinely fearless in drawing deep connections across traditions and time in order to make observations about the nature of the virtues. In particular, she takes some important initial steps towards following through on virtue ethic's long-time promise to present an account of the virtues against the backdrop of a sophisticated psychology. (Kantian Review)

With Christine Swanton's new book, contemporary virtue ethics takes a confident step out of the philosophical nursery ... no one interested in the health and prospects of moral philosophy should ignore this excellent book. (Samantha Vice, Times Literary Supplement)

Swanton's pluralism is a welcome and important contribution to pluralism. Her account is complex and provocative, surely to be probed by the philosophical community. (George Harris, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)

Christine Swanton offers a new, comprehensive theory of virtue ethics which addresses the major concerns of modern ethical theory from a character-based perspective. Discussion of many problems in moral theory, such as moral constraints, rightness of action, the good life, the demandingness of ethics, the role of the subjective, and the practicality of ethics, has been dominated by Kantian and Consequentialist theories, with their own distinctive conceptual apparatus. Virtue Ethics shows how a different framework can shed new light on these intractable issues.

Swanton's approach is distinctive in that it departs in significant ways from classical versions of virtue ethics derived primarily from Aristotle. Employing insights from Nietzsche and other sources, she argues against both eudaimonistic virtue ethics and traditional virtue ethical conceptions of rightness. In developing a pluralistic view, she shows how different 'modes of moral acknowledgement' such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity, are embedded in the very fabric of virtue, the moral life, and the good life.